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The European Convention on Human Rights: 
The First Half Century
by A. W. Brian Simpson*
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms was signed in the Barberini Palace in Rome on 4 November
1950. It came into force, once there were sufficient ratifications, on 3
September 1953. Its First Protocol, which was really part of the original
Convention but contained provisions which gave rise to special diffi-
culties in the negotiations, was signed in Paris on 20 March 1952. It
dealt with aspects of the rights of property, to education, and to free
elections, and came into force on 18 May 1954. Since then there have
been a number of further protocols, some dealing with matters of sub-
stance, and others with matters of procedure. Thus the Sixth Protocol
dealt with the abolition of the death penalty except in time of war, and
the Thirteenth Protocol with its abolition in times of war. The Eleventh
Protocol made radical changes to the procedural and institutional mech-
anisms for handling complaints that the Convention had been violated.
The Fourteenth, adopted in 2004 but not yet in force, will make even
more radical changes to these mechanisms.
The Convention and its Protocols constitute the most important
achievements of the Council of Europe. The Council was established by
a treaty of 5 May 1949. Originally there were ten members of the
Council: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. By the time
the Convention was signed, there were four more: Greece, Turkey, the
Saar (soon to become part of West Germany), and West Germany itself.
* Brian Simpson is the Charles F. & Edith J. Clyne Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan Law School. His main interests are in legal philosophy,
legal history and European Human Rights law. He has acted as consultant in a num-
ber of cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
The treaty provided that every member must:
...accept the principles of the rule of law and of the
enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of
human rights and fundamental freedoms... 
Members must also collaborate in the aim of the Council, which
was to:
...achieve a greater unity between its members for the
purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and
principles which are their common heritage and facili-
tating their economic and social progress.
The Council is not a federation, and with some exceptions operates
by consensus. The basic institutions are the Committee of Ministers,
comprising the Foreign Ministers or their deputies of member states,
and a Consultative Assembly. The Assembly provides a democratic
input, but its members are not directly elected. They are in effect dele-
gates from national Parliaments. It has been given no legislative pow-
ers. 
You may wonder why the Council (which, incidentally, is not the
ancestor of the European Union) was established back in 1949. It all
began with a House of Commons speech in January 1948 by Ernest
Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary - Uncle Ernie as he was affection-
ately know to British diplomats. Late in 1947 he came to think that any
attempt to provide for the future of Europe through negotiation with the
Soviet Union was doomed to failure. In this speech, he called for the
establishment of what he called a spiritual union of the Western
European democracies. It would offer an ideological alternative to
Soviet communism, one different too from American capitalism, and
facilitate the development of a coordinated response to European prob-
lems, which were acute at the time. So the Council was a product of the
Cold War. There were many in Western Europe who sought salvation in
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the creation of a federal Europe, but Bevin and his British colleagues
were hostile to the federalists, and favoured the establishment of a loos-
er union, which would not involve any sacrifice of sovereignty to a fed-
eral European Government. So the Council of Europe was also intend-
ed to provide an alternative to a European Federation, an idea which
many politicians, particularly in continental Europe, supported at this
time, as they still do.
The first task the Council addressed was production of a Charter or
Convention of human rights. Why? The state of Western Europe, espe-
cially the parts which had been occupied by Germany and others which
had been fought over, was grim. German cities were little more than
heaps of rubble, and the same was true, for example, for towns and vil-
lages in Normandy, and of course elsewhere. Economies had collapsed,
and in the terrible winter of 1947 the population of Germany came near
to starvation. In the United Kingdom, which had suffered from bomb-
ing but had escaped occupation except in the Channel Islands, food
rations had to be reduced even below their wartime level. At huge cost
fascism had, at least for the time being, been defeated, though both
Spain and Portugal remained totalitarian countries under forms of fas-
cism. Soviet communism offered what to many seemed a way forward,
and in Western Europe both Italy and France were at risk of becoming
communist countries. The future of Western Germany was unpre-
dictable. Beyond the iron curtain, which included of course much of
Germany, Soviet communism was triumphant. So there was fear that
one monster, fascism, might soon be replaced by another, Soviet com-
munism. One response was for the Western democracies to offer some
clear statement of an alternative vision of society, a Charter which
would spell out the liberal democratic ideals for whose protection the
war, it was thought, had been fought. So the Charter was, if you like, a
product of fear that the liberty which had recently been re-established
was under grave threat.  The threat was exacerbated by the military
power of the Soviets; it was seriously thought in 1948 that the Soviets
might be at the Pyrenees in six or so weeks.
In Western European countries which had experienced the horrors
of occupation there was another fear, one which I think Americans may
not find easy to understand; British negotiators in the 1940s and 1950s
too did not entirely grasp its importance. This was the fear of govern-
ment generated by recent foreign occupation. Experience had shown
that the governments of European nation states simply could not be
trusted. For example, take the wartime history of France that has only
fairly recently come to be written with some objectivity. Very many of
the terrible things which were done to the French under the Vichy
regime were done by the French to the French. Many years after the war
some of those responsible for the notorious massacre of the inhabitants
of Oradour, now a memorial to wartime atrocities, were put on trial;
most of the defendants were Frenchmen, from Alsace is true, but
Frenchmen nevertheless. It was French officials who consigned French
Jews to the extermination camps. And I am sorry to say that some nasty
things went on in the British Channel Islands too.
A third factor was disillusion with the United Nations, which had
not lived up to the high hopes which had accompanied its establishment
in 1945. It had become a battleground of the Cold War, where scoring
silly points had come to replace any attempt to cooperate to produce a
better and a safer world. It had also become a stage whose potential was
exploited by the increasingly confident and intransigent anti-colonial
movement, supported, with ludicrous insincerity, by the Soviet Union.
So far as human rights protection was concerned matters had got off to
a reasonable start in 1948 with the Universal Declaration, and the
Genocide Convention. In the case of the Declaration, Eleanor Roosevelt
was one of the important players. But thereafter, at least in the view of
the British negotiators and of many other Europeans, progress had more
or less come to an end. There were by the 1950s profound suspicions
both of the Soviet Union and the USA, particularly after the establish-
ment of the Eisenhower administration. The attitude of both powers to
the international protection of human rights appeared to be deeply hyp-
ocritical. The USA seemed to adhere to what I have called the export
theory of human rights, under which human rights protection was never
to intrude upon the domestic sovereignty of the American federation
4 qÜÉj~ìêáÅÉ~åÇjìêáÉäcìäíçåiÉÅíìêÉpÉêáÉë
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE FIRST HALF CENTURY 5
and its component States. If Western Europe was to establish interna-
tional human rights protection, it seemed idle to rely upon the United
Nations. Europe must go it alone.
Finally I shall mention another factor. There were many committed
federalists in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and
they had high hopes of using the Council as a vehicle for the establish-
ment of a federal Europe. The British Foreign Office officials favoured
diverting their energies to the production of a Charter of Human Rights
- it gave them something harmless to do. So long as it was carefully
drafted and had weak enforcement mechanisms, what harm could such
a Charter do? It might even do some positive good. And if its provisions
merely reflected the existing state of affairs in Western Europe, such
surrender of sovereignty as might be involved was of little practical sig-
nificance. 
The thinking behind the Convention was that its function was
indeed conservative: the protection of the liberty recently recovered but
again under threat in Western European countries, countries committed
to the rule of law and the protection of dignity, democratic ideals and
freedom. One of the chief protagonists in the Consultative Assembly
was Pierre Henri Teitgen, a Gaullist minister who had been active in the
resistance, and indeed had been lucky to survive the war. He explained:
Democracies do not become Nazi countries in one
day. Evil progresses cunningly, with a minority operat-
ing, as it were, to remove the levers of control. One by
one freedoms are suppressed in one sphere after anoth-
er. Public opinion and the entire national conscience are
asphyxiated. And then, when everything is in order, the
Fuhrer is installed.
Or as James Madison put it:
I believe there are more instances of the abridgement
of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent
encroachments of those in power than by violent and
sudden usurpation. 
Both these statements have a chilling resonance today in the world
of the war on terrorism. 
It was not then believed that the Convention would much affect the
existing situation in member states. There were a few known problems;
thus the Norwegian Constitution brightly provided that “Jesuits will not
be tolerated.” Such problems could be handled by temporary and spe-
cific reservations until the Constitution could be amended, as indeed it
soon was. The United Kingdom took the line that substantial compli-
ance was all that was required, and entered no reservations at all.
The text of the original Convention is not that of the present day
Convention, which has been amended by other Protocols. By way of
substance, the original lists a number of rights in the Convention itself
and its First Protocol. Most, but not all of them have limitations, which
are specified in relation to each right. Under Article 15, States may, in
special circumstances, derogate from their obligations, for example, in
times of war or of a national emergency threatening the life of the
nation. But some rights are non-derogable; for example, torture, includ-
ing inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, is ruled out in all
circumstances. The right to derogate is severely restricted in the text of
the relevant article by the concept of strict necessity. The rights are to
be guaranteed to everyone within the jurisdiction of the member state -
they are not, for example, confined to citizens. Subsequent jurispru-
dence has extended the protection, in some instances, to persons outside
the territory of the member state, and the extent of this extra-territorial
protection is currently a matter of considerable importance. Member
states are to provide an effective remedy for their violation. The origi-
nal Convention contained no free standing provision against discrimi-
nation - member states were not, however, to discriminate in the pro-
tection of the listed convention rights. There is now a Twelfth Protocol
which does provide a free standing prohibition of discrimination, but it
still needs more ratifications before it comes into force. The core rights
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protected in the original Convention and the First Protocol remain the
basis of the system today.
The text is sometimes drafted in very specific terms, and sometimes
in more general terms. At the time, there was a dispute as to how it
should be drafted. The United Kingdom argued for very specific draft-
ing; negotiators from civil law countries argued for generally expressed
provisions, which would be given more precision through the develop-
ment of a court based jurisprudence of rights. In the end the second
view won out, but the text itself reflects a compromise.
The institutions established by the Convention were a Commission
and a Court. The Commission was to decide on the admissibility of
complaints, acting as a filter to weed out unmeritorious or procedurally
improper complaints, for there was fear that the system might be del-
uged by such complaints. It was to investigate the complaint, and it
could express an opinion as to whether there had been a violation of the
Convention, but it had no power to issue a binding judgement. It was
also to try to arrange a friendly settlement. Its procedures were confi-
dential. The idea was that most complaints would never get beyond the
Commission.
The Convention also made provision for the establishment of a
Court of Human Rights, with the power to issue binding judgements.
The thinking of the civilian negotiators was that in the course of time
the Court would evolve a jurisprudence of rights, what we would call a
case law of rights. But submission to a Court was more than some of
the original member states could accept, and so acceptance of the juris-
diction of the Court was made optional. The Court was not to be a Court
of Appeal from national courts; it merely had the power to rule on
whether there had been a violation of the Convention or not. It was then
for the defaulting state, under the supervision of the Committee of
Ministers, to do what was needed to put matters right. The Court could,
however, give a ruling as to what monetary compensation ought to be
paid.
At the top of the system was this Committee, a political rather than
a judicial body. For member states not accepting the jurisdiction of the
Court, it would decide what action was to be taken on the report of the
Commission. For states accepting the jurisdiction of the Court, it was to
supervise what the respondent country ought to do in response to the
Court’s decision.
Who could initiate a complaint? Member states of course. But what
about individuals? In the original Convention member states had an
option as to whether to allow individuals to make complaints and initi-
ate proceedings, and even if they were permitted to do so, they then had
no direct access to the Court; only the Commission could in such a case
take the matter to the Court. The right of individual petition was first
accepted by Denmark and then by the Republic of Ireland. The United
Kingdom did not accept it until 1966, by which time the British Empire
had largely been dismantled. The British Colonial Office had been firm
in opposition. Under the Convention, protection could be extended to
colonial territories, and the United Kingdom, the major European colo-
nial power, did indeed extend it to virtually all of its dependent posses-
sions. But the Colonial Office was nervous over giving colonial subjects
the right of individual petition, and the right, though accepted for the
United Kingdom itself in 1966, was not then extended to the relics of
the Empire. Nervousness over the right of individual petition was by no
means confined to the British government. France did not accept it until
1981, and it never operated in the vast original French colonial empire.
Turkey did not accept the right until 1987.
The first case initiated by an individual petition that actually went
to the Court was the entertainingly titled Lawless v. Republic of Ireland,
litigated between 1957 and 1961. Lawless complained about the use of
emergency powers against the Irish Republican Army in the Republic
of Ireland; he had been detained for a short while. Ireland had derogat-
ed from provisions of the Convention which normally rule out detention
without trial, because, it was argued, there had been in the Republic a
public emergency threatening the life of the nation. This was so because
the IRA had been using the Republic as a base for paramilitary opera-
tions in Northern Ireland. The Irish government won the case; the
Convention institutions have usually adopted a sympathetic attitude to
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governments confronted by insurrectionary movements, particularly in
the early years, although this may now be changing. 
Let me now very briefly explain what has happened in the half cen-
tury which has passed since the Convention first came into force. First,
as I have already indicated, there have been a number of Protocols.
Perhaps the most important substantively is the Sixth Protocol, abolish-
ing the death penalty in time of peace. At the time when the Convention
was signed, a number of member states still had the death penalty; these
included the United Kingdom. But it was already something of a gut-
tering candle. Nevertheless the Convention quite explicitly recognised
its legitimate existence. In the United Kingdom I suspect that a referen-
dum, especially if conducted just after some particularly unpleasant
killing, for example, of a child, would produce a majority for its rein-
troduction, but there is no practical possibility of its being reintroduced.
Under the jurisprudence of the Court member States cannot today law-
fully extradite a person to a country where they run the risk of suffering
capital punishment. This may exclude extradition to the USA.
Procedurally the Eleventh Protocol of 1998 ended the two tier system
of Commission and Court; there is now just a Court, which sits in pan-
els, and there is provision for a specially authoritative Grand Chamber,
which to some degree acts as a sort of appellate body, although it is not
technically a Court of Appeal. Whether this change in the mechanics of
the system has improved it is dubious at best. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, all parties to the
Convention now have to accept both the jurisdiction of the Court and
the right of individual petition. Interstate cases have always been
extremely rare; states are generally extremely reluctant to initiate pro-
ceedings against other states except to secure some political end; it was,
for example, for political reasons that Greece brought proceedings
against the United Kingdom in 1956 over the conduct of the British
Government in response to the EOKA insurrectionary movement in
Cyprus which sought to unite Cyprus with Greece. A number of
Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, joined by the
Netherlands, did take proceedings against Greece for the grave miscon-
duct of the government of the colonels; these proceedings led to
Greece’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe. No obvious political
benefit accrued to these states from this action. The rarity of interstate
cases brings out the fact that governments are not to be trusted to cham-
pion the protection of human rights.
Thirdly, very largely in response to individual petitions, the
Strasbourg institutions - the Court, and less importantly the
Commission while it existed - have developed a massive jurisprudence
or case law of human rights. To a large extent, the Strasbourg judicial
opinions are drafted initially by members of the staff of the Registry;
there are no law clerks at Strasbourg to produce drafts or engage in
research. Opinions are far more systematic and orderly than the ram-
bling and argumentative opinions of the US Supreme Court or of the
English House of Lords, and much less personalised. In the course of
developing its jurisprudence the Court has evolved various general prin-
ciples which are not to be found anywhere stated in the text of the
Convention; they have been called “the invisible articles.” I cannot
mention them all, but two are of particular importance.
The first of these was first enunciated in a case in 1978, brought by
one Tyrer against the United Kingdom. He was a young man convicted
of an assault, and the Court in the Isle of Man ordered that he should be
birched, that is beaten on his bare buttocks with a weapon called a birch
rod. He was indeed birched. This form of judicial punishment had by
then been abolished in mainland Britain, but still existed in the Isle of
Man, which is a Crown dependency, has its own legal system, and, for
good measure, the oldest Parliament in Europe. Many of the inhabitants
of the Isle of Man at this time placed a high value on this punishment,
which, they believed, protected them from British hooligans visiting
from the mainland. The Court ruled that the Convention must be inter-
preted as a “living instrument,” and that although birching might not
have been viewed as a violation of the Convention when it was first
brought into force, evolving standards in Europe had come to rule out
judicial corporal punishment. It was now to be viewed as a “degrading
punishment” and as such a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
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Since this case was decided, there has been no question of applying any
notion of original intent as controlling the interpretation of the
Convention. In the case the British judge, Sir Gerald Fitztmaurice - he
had previously been the Foreign Office Legal Adviser - dissented, but
his view did not prevail. He pointed out, correctly, that when the United
Kingdom signed up to the Convention it never occurred to anyone that
it would have the effect of banning judicial corporal punishment. Back
in the 1950s, Britain was a veritable paradise of flagellation. Sir
Gerald’s capacity to influence his fellow judges may have been reduced
by the fact that in judicial conferences he would give his opinion, and
then retire behind a copy of the London Times newspaper, ignoring
other contributions to the discussion. Fairly recently I took part in pro-
viding training in the Isle of Man on human rights law, and I and my
colleagues agreed it would be politic not to mention Tyrer; back in 1978
the decision provoked fury on the island, and it was with some difficul-
ty that the central British government persuaded the Manxsmen and
Manxswomen (for that is what they are called) to abolish the practice.
But we soon discovered that opposition to the abolition of birching no
longer excited the islanders; things had moved on. Standards of human
rights protection had indeed evolved.
The other invisible article or doctrine I shall mention is that of the
“margin of appreciation,” a concept derived from continental adminis-
trative law. According to this doctrine, each state has a certain degree of
discretion as to how it implements obligations under the Convention.
This is related to the notion that the protection of human rights in mem-
ber states is primarily the responsibility of each state; the Convention
does not require complete uniformity. Ideas of this sort are sometimes
related to what is labelled the “principle of subsidiarity.” Of course
wherever any form of judicial review exists, courts have evolved doc-
trines which permit the agency being reviewed to exercise some meas-
ure of discretion; the language in which these doctrines are expressed
will vary from legal system to legal system.
The next important development has been the extension of the
membership of the Council of Europe, which now includes forty-five
states. Portugal and Spain came in from the cold and joined the Council
in 1976 and 1977 respectively. Switzerland, offered membership many
years earlier, joined in 1974. Tiny Liechtenstein joined in 1978, and,
being short of human rights lawyers, long used a distinguished
Canadian as its judge - judges do not have to be nationals of the coun-
try they represent. Andorra, high in the Pyrenees and ruled by the
President of France in his personal capacity together with the bishop of
Urgel, joined in 1994. Indirectly it was affected by the Convention ear-
lier. Having no prison of its own, it had used space in a French prison,
and there the Convention applied. Once the Cold War ended, states
under Soviet domination or strong influence began to be admitted:
Finland in 1989, Hungary in 1990, and, believe it or not, the Russian
Federation in 1996, so that the Convention now even extends to protect
individuals in Siberia, which is thus somewhat oddly treated as part of
Europe. It also covers Albania, where I have taught human rights law to
an impressive group of students, most of them young women, and this
in a land where the blood feud, carefully regulated by the Kanun of Lek,
about which you can read in a notable novel by Ismail Kadare, is not yet
extinct. Not long ago there was indeed a killing in Detroit in pursuance
of an Albanian blood feud. The process of extension has now ended,
except for the possibility that Belarus and Monaco may still join.1
Somewhere around 800,000,000 people are now, in principle, protect-
ed.
With this extension, the function of the Convention has changed; it
has become an instrument for assisting the establishment of liberal dem-
ocratic systems of government in new member states. It has taken on
what may be called a missionary function. When a country such as
Albania or the Russian Federation joins the club, the Convention and its
protocols represent aspirational goals, it is only by degrees that these
goals will be achieved. Democracy is of course not just about having
elections, and only one article, in the First Protocol, deals with elec-
tions. It is also about having a system of government which respects the
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ideal of the rule of law, accepts considerable limits, some of them
absolute, upon the employment of force and state power against indi-
viduals, tolerates differences, and regards the protection of individual
autonomy, political liberty and dignity as principal aims of government,
thereby imposing limits to the degree to which other legitimate aims of
government may be pursued. With the change in function of the
Convention, there has developed the practice of helping new member
states to bring their legal and administrative arrangements into con-
formity, as, for example, by organising training courses for lawyers and
judges, and by checking the compatibility of laws; here the first exam-
ple was Finland.
But the extension of the coverage or the Convention and growing
knowledge about it have brought about administrative problems. The
trickle of individual petitions has become a flood. Between 1955 and
1983, 76 judgements were delivered by the court. Just under 11,000
applications were registered out of 25,000 files provisionally opened by
the officials in the Registry. A mere 326 applications were declared
admissible. In the year 2000 alone, 26,000 provisional files were
opened, and over 10,000 applications were registered. 1,082 applica-
tions were declared admissible, and no fewer that 695 judgements
delivered. So there is a serious problem here. But is worth noting that
relatively few applications are declared admissible, and in recent times
most findings of violations have been against only three countries -
Italy, France and Turkey. To a considerable extent these violations are
repetitive; Italy has, for example, been in continuous trouble over the
excessive length of legal proceedings. So much thought has been given
to addressing the problems of overload. They need to be addressed if the
system is not to become a victim of its own success. The Fourteenth
Protocol, not yet in force, represents an attempt to deal with the prob-
lems of overload.
There are other problems. For example, the official languages of the
Convention are French and English. Arrangements for making materi-
als available in the many other languages in use in the Council of
Europe are still defective. The NGO in London to which students from
Columbia and Michigan go as interns, called the AIRE Centre, is work-
ing to deal with this problem, but it will be some time before it is real-
ly solved. The costs involved will be considerable, and governments are
not as enthusiastic as they ought to be to spend money on human rights
protection. 
Nothing like the European Convention had ever been negotiated
before in the whole history of the world. Clearly acceptance of the obli-
gations imposed by the Convention involved a loss of state sovereign-
ty. Europe, whether organised into the European Union, or in the much
larger Council of Europe, or in the even larger Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, to which incidentally the USA is a party,
belongs, it has been argued with some force, to a newly emerging post
modern world. In this world, traditional nation states such as France or
Italy or Germany do continue to exist, but they no longer seek to retain
control of all aspects of what have traditionally been viewed as their
domestic affairs. They have come together to agree to establish and
maintain systems under which they accept international regulation and
control over a growing number of matters, and, through the Strasbourg
Court, a degree of control over the way in which they may treat their
own citizens. They do so because they have come to think that this lim-
ited surrender of sovereignty is in their own long term interests. Yet the
European organizations I have mentioned do not constitute federations.
The Council of Europe is certainly not a federation of any kind.
Some have seen in the system established by the European
Convention the forces of evil at work. For the purpose of illustration, I
refer to Robert Bork’s, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges
(2003). Mr. Bork tells us that the European Court of Human Rights is
one of the institutions whose judges “are continuing to undermine dem-
ocratic institutions and to enact the agenda of the liberal Left or New
Class.” He explains elsewhere that this New Class of “faux” intellectu-
als comprises academics at all levels, denizens of Hollywood; mainline
clergy and church bureaucracies; personnel of museums, galleries and
philanthropic foundations, radical environmentalists; and activist
groups for a multiplicity of causes which Mr. Bork sadly does not list.
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Presumably they include the judges of the Strasbourg Court. These sup-
posedly evil people are characterised by smugness and a softness of
spirit, a desire to ensure that no one other than their intellectual enemies
suffers the least degree of discomfort. They heartily dislike bourgeois
culture, so they displace traditional moralities with cultural socialism.
To bolster his argument, he selects from the thousands of decisions of
the Strasbourg Court and Commission a handful to which he takes
exception. It comes as no surprise that they deal with gay rights in
Northern Ireland, homosexuals in the armed services, beating children,
extradition and death row, and freedom of information in relation to
abortion and birth control. Sex, violent punishment, death, and abortion
are issues which obsess certain persons in the USA. I cannot take all this
very seriously, though it is of course true that some of the decisions of
the Court can legitimately be regarded as objectionable. And it must be
conceded, although he does not make this point, that from the very
beginning there were those who had serious misgivings about the
European Convention. Lord Jowitt, who was the Lord Chancellor in
England in 1950, was horrified when he saw the draft text, and called
the convention “meaningless and dangerous.” Let me also quote a line
from a memorandum of 1951 by J. J. Wallace, a Colonial Office civil
servant:
If ever there should be a further protocol covering yet
more rights (and I suppose we cannot absolutely rule out
this frightful possibility)....
When Greece brought the first case against the United Kingdom
over Cyprus in 1956 there were suggestions that the United Kingdom
might denounce the Convention, but nothing came of this. The case was
fought within the terms of the Convention, and the United Kingdom
won by the skin of her teeth, and only after abandoning two of the more
objectionable mechanisms used for suppressing the insurrection.
Greece actually did denounce the Convention in 1969, but not in the
name of protecting democracy from the over mighty judiciary. Greece
ratified it again in 1974. There were also long delays both in accepting
the Convention at all, and in accepting individual petition and the juris-
diction of the Court. France, though much involved in the negotiations
in 1949-50, did not even ratify at all until 1974, Turkey took until 1954.
Switzerland only ratified in 1974, with numerous reservations. 
A picture of why it has come to be accepted, and how it affects life,
may be given by a story of the Court in action. Mrs. Pellegrini married
M. Gigliozzi in 1962. In February 1987 she took proceedings for judi-
cial separation. On 20 November 1987, she was summoned to appear
before the Lazio Regional Ecclesiastical Court in the Vatican. She
attended on 1 December, having had no notice what the case was about.
Her long standing marriage to her husband was annulled on grounds of
consanguinity - her mother and husband were cousins. She may have
had a dispensation; such dispensations are commonplace in Italy. She
was informed, wrongly, that it had been declared a nullity on 6
November, that is before the hearing; this was a mistake for 10
December. The proceedings were summary, and she had no legal repre-
sentation. An appeal upheld the decision. She was still not represented,
and there was no proper disclosure of documents. Under the Concordat
between the Papacy and the Italian State domestic courts in Italy were
bound to accept as binding decisions of this character taken by ecclesi-
astical courts of the Vatican. Her husband had of course brought the pro-
ceedings in the Vatican court in order to forestall any claim for support
under the judicial separation which she was seeking. The case was
eventually taken to Strasbourg as involving a violation of Article 6 (1);
she won, and the eventual outcome was a settlement with her ex hus-
band. The case was of course nothing to do with over mighty judges
undermining democracy; it was about the right of individuals to enjoy
what in the USA would be called due process of law, which is of course
an important aspect of the way democratic states should conduct their
affairs. To be sure, one might criticise the decision (though I would not)
for imposing too strict a standard. But as a threat to democracy it is a
non-starter.
Now let me describe a case which gave rise to outrage in Britain -
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its name is McCann, Farrell and Savage v. United Kingdom, and it was
decided by a divided Court in 1995, though again the outrage had noth-
ing to do with protecting democracy. The facts are complicated and I
can only give a brief account. Three members of the Provisional IRA,
two men and one woman, had entered Gibraltar from Spain to carry out
reconnaissance as part of a plan to drive a car bomb into the city. The
idea was to detonate it during a military ceremony, and kill or maim
anyone who happened to be around when it went off. This ceremony
would have been attended by many civilian members of the public,
including children. British intelligence was aware of this plan, and the
three persons were kept under surveillance, with the cooperation of the
Spanish police, on their journey to Gibraltar; no details of this surveil-
lance in Spain have ever been made public. When they entered
Gibraltar at the crossing point with Spain, they were identified and fol-
lowed by armed plain clothed members of the Special Air Service, a
British military formation specialising in counter-terrorist operations.
The soldiers who trailed the three bombers were told that the car bomb
was thought to be already in Gibraltar, where there was indeed a suspect
vehicle. In fact it turned out that this vehicle was wholly unconnected
with the plot. They were also told that the car bomb might be detonat-
ed at any time by a radio control device. In fact the bomb was not yet
anywhere in Gibraltar, but was still in Spain in a car park. It contained
25 kilograms of Semtex explosive, surrounded with ammunition so as
to maximise its capacity to kill and injure. Quite how this operation was
financed is not publicly known, but lest it be thought that the financing
of violent insurrectionary organisations from other countries is a new
problem, let me recall that much support for the IRA has come from
American organisations.
The soldiers, through the briefing, were given to believe that if any
of the suspects made a sudden move - for example, putting a hand in a
pocket - the bomb might be detonated. It was their job to prevent this,
and the only way they could do this was by shooting the suspect. One
of the suspects did make such a move and within a matter of seconds all
three were killed. Their families brought a case alleging a violation of
the right to life, as protected by Article 2 of the Convention, which
applies in Gibraltar. At the time there was a widespread belief that
British security forces were conducting operations against the IRA
deliberately intended to lead to the death of suspects, thus, as it were,
orchestrating extra-judicial killings - judicial capital punishment for
murder was no longer available at this time. The Gibraltar operation had
all the appearance of such an operation, being organised in a manner
which would almost inevitably lead to the death of the three terrorists.
I should perhaps explain that the three soldiers were highly trained and,
once fire was opened at the short ranges involved, certain to kill. One
of the suspects was hit by no less than seventeen bullets.  
The Court, by a majority, held that there had been a violation, but
declined to award any compensation to the families. It did not base its
decision on the view that there had been a deliberate extra-judicial
killing, or on any misconduct by the soldiers. In the jurisprudence of the
Court there has developed the doctrine that member states have a posi-
tive obligation to take steps to protect the Convention rights; thus, for
example, in the case of violent killings, member states have an obliga-
tion to conduct a proper enquiry into the death. The majority held that
in the planning of the operation the United Kingdom had not discharged
this positive obligation; the operation ought to have been and could
have been so planned as to respect the right to life of the three individ-
uals killed, as well of course as the right to life to those threatened by
the bomb. For example, they might have been arrested at the frontier,
and better checks might have been made of the suspect vehicle; there
were various possibilities. I happened to be in the Court when the deci-
sion was delivered, where it caused much excitement. I was at once
approached by journalists who thought I must be a relative; in fact I was
there in connection with another case. Back in Britain, where popular
opinion largely applauded the killing of the three terrorists, both the
press and the government exploded with fury; how dare the Court crit-
icise the actions of the security services. There was even wholly insin-
cere talk by politicians of denouncing the Convention. In reality the
majority view of the Strasbourg judges involved much weaker criticism
18 qÜÉj~ìêáÅÉ~åÇjìêáÉäcìäíçåiÉÅíìêÉpÉêáÉë
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE FIRST HALF CENTURY 19
of the conduct of the operation than could very reasonably have been
made on the facts, and the judges further softened their decision by the
refusal to assess any compensation, a refusal I personally find political-
ly understandable but legally odd, there being no evidence that the fam-
ily members were in any way complicit. I have a collection of British
newspapers with their angry headlines which I show students when we
discuss the case. The Norwegian President of the Court, Judge Rolv
Ryssdal, who had in fact dissented, visited London soon after the deci-
sion and delivered a lecture designed to cool the heat. And before long
the heat died down. There is room for legitimate disagreement, but, to
put my own cards of the table, I think the operation was indeed set up
to ensure the death of the three suspects, and was certainly not planned
so as to respect their right to life. But of course many would not take the
view that this mattered. 
There was in reality never any possibility of the United Kingdom
denouncing the Convention in response to the Gibraltar case, and the
decision did not make necessary any change in its law or procedure.
Here I should explain that in a case where a violation has occurred, the
Court may specify a monetary payment to be made to the injured party
by way of just satisfaction, but it does not take any action to check that
the money has been paid or take any further action if it has not. Nor does
it issue any order to the respondent state, nor provide any guidance, nor
make any declaration, stating what needs to be done to put matters to
rights in the light of its finding of a violation. It has no power to annul
legislation or judicial decisions or administrative actions which have
violated the Convention. It is the job of the Committee of Ministers, in
consultation with the respondent state, to handle all such matters.
Where some action is called for, for example, a change in the law, it is
the practice of the Committee to review the situation every six months.
If the violation arises from some structural problem or from the state of
the law, it may be a complex and long drawn out matter for the offend-
ing state to take the necessary action. 
The whole procedure is well illustrated by the Kalashnikov case,
decided in 1999, which concerned the appalling conditions in Russian
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prisons. Briefly stated, Mr. Kalashnikov spent the years from 1995 to
2000 incarcerated, mainly in pre-trial detention. Much of this time he
was held in a cell which measured 17 square metres, contained 8 bunk
beds, and was occupied by 24 prisoners. Television and a light were per-
manently on. The toilet was in the cell and it was unscreened. Meals had
to be eaten within a metre of it. There was no proper ventilation; the cell
was very hot in summer and very cold in winter. There was heavy
smoking by prisoners. The cell was infested with cockroaches and ants.
He developed skin diseases and fungal infections, losing toenails and
some fingernails. Some of his fellow prisoners suffered from syphilis
and tuberculosis. He suffered from neurocirculatory dystonia, astheno-
neurotic syndrome, chronic gastroduodenitis, fungal infections to feet,
hands and groin, and mycosis. God knows what these all are, but they
cannot have been a lot of fun. He did receive some medical treatment
for scabies. The Court found violations of the right not to be subjected
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and also violations
of his right to a fair trial in a reasonable time. Plainly Russian prisons,
many of which are in the same sort of condition, cannot be cleaned up
overnight. So at present steps are being taken under the supervision of
the Committee of Ministers to reform the system. One step is a reduc-
tion in the excessive use of pre-trial detention, one of the reasons for
gross overcrowding. Another step which would alleviate the situation is
a reduction of delay in bringing prisoners to trial. Yet another is the seg-
regation of prisoners suffering from dangerous communicable diseases.
The award of reparation in this case gave Mr. Kalashnikov the modest
sum of 5,000 Euros. You may speculate as to why the Court fixed on
such a low figure.
In general, member states have done what is needed to conform to
rulings of the Court, albeit sometimes after delay and with reluctance.
Thus money awards have usually been satisfied, often very promptly.
The worst instance of delay involved the case of Loizidou v. Turkey,
decided in 1996. This case was brought by a Greek Cypriot woman who
owned property in Northern Cyprus, where there has been established
an illegal republic effectively under Turkish control. Mrs. Loizidou had
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE FIRST HALF CENTURY 21
wholly lost the control and use of this property, and the Court decided
that Turkey, being in effective control of the territory, was answerable
under the Convention for what went on there. It made an order for repa-
ration. The Turkish government was extremely reluctant to pay the
money - there are of course many other persons who have similar com-
plaints, but at the time of this lecture it appears that the money has been
paid, and a system established to handle other similar complaints.
Where action other than the payment of money is required by the
Committee of Ministers, there has again been a general practice of con-
formity, albeit sometimes with delay, which may be unavoidable, and
reluctance. The member states with the worst record here have been
Italy, which is forever in trouble over the excessive length of proceed-
ings, France, whose violations have been very varied in nature, and
Turkey, the problem there being the treatment of the Kurdish minority
and the existence of Northern Cyprus. In the future there are fears, for
example, over the Russian Federation. There are bound to be difficul-
ties with countries which have no tradition of respect for the rule of law
as this is understood in the West, and no tradition of accepting judicial
review of administrative action. Some of the former Iron Curtain coun-
ties had, under communism, a somewhat different conception of rights,
which placed less emphasis on individualism and on political liberty,
and more on economic and social rights and on a reciprocal relationship
between rights and duties. There are also institutional difficulties; the
role of the Prosecutor in, for example, in the former Soviet Union, with
his control over the use of pre-trial detention, cannot really be accom-
modated with the provisions of the Convention without some radical
changes. In the United Kingdom (and in most other member states)
there is a settled policy of automatic compliance. 
Sometimes the Court indicates action which should be taken before
a case comes to be adjudicated - for example, it may wish a member
state not to deport a person until the Court can rule on the legality of the
deportation under the Convention. In the Strasbourg jurisprudence such
“indications” have not, in the past, been thought to impose binding obli-
gations on the respondent state. But they have regularly been respected.
Compliance with them in deportation cases posed some problems in
Swedish domestic law, but it has now been changed to permit a stay of
execution in such cases when an international body makes such a
request. One cannot but contrast this situation with that which obtains
in the USA. Germany brought a case in the International Court of
Justice against the USA because of a failure to observe the obligation
which the USA had undertaken by treaty to ensure consular notification
when a German national was charged with a serious offense. The Court
requested that the persons involved not be executed, for a capital charge
was involved, before it had an opportunity to rule on the case. This
request was not acted upon, and the International Court ruled that this
had been a breach of international law over and above the primary
breach of international law involved in the failure to see that the
German consul was notified. The attitude of the US authorities was all
the more odd in that very considerable numbers of US citizens work or
travel abroad and from time to time end up on criminal charges, and one
would have thought that it was in the interests of the USA to support
treaty arrangements, which are in force in many of their host countries,
requiring consular notification.
Some have wondered why there has been this general conformity
within the Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers could, in
theory at least, expel a recalcitrant state from the Council of Europe. But
this has never been a serious possibility; Greece, which under the
regime of the Colonels, did defy the Convention, precluded any prob-
lem by denouncing and itself leaving the Council. I am not sure that any
comprehensive explanation is possible, but one reason is that states
which hope, in due course, to be admitted to the European Union, with
all the economic benefits that follow, have first to sign on to the
Convention and exhibit their will and ability to act as good Europeans
by conformity. This certainly seems to have acted as a powerful motive,
but it does not explain compliance by states which are already in the
European Union. 
I think, though it is not possible to produce very hard evidence, that
conformity is encouraged by the evolution of the new post modern
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Europe, in which cooperation between nation states, rather than con-
flict, is thought to benefit those states. The characteristics of this post
modern world have been described by a British diplomat, Robert
Cooper, in his The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the
Twenty-First Century (2003). One characteristic of the new relationship
between nation states is openness, achieved through mutual acceptance
- let me emphasise mutual - of intrusive verification procedures. The
most obvious example relates not to human rights protection but to mil-
itary hardware and organisation for war. In Europe this is achieved
through the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. As you will know
the USA (though a party to this treaty) does not itself belong to any such
world - it insists that other countries, with notable exceptions, accept
intrusive verification procedures it is reluctant to accept for itself.
Through the Convention and the Strasbourg institutions, European
states have come to accept a system of intrusive verification in relation
to the operation of democratic institutions and the protection of human
rights. Let me call attention to the most striking example. Under Article
3 of the ECHR, “No one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.” There are no exceptions, and the
article is non-derogable. Article 13 of the Convention binds parties to
provide an effective remedy before a national authority for violations of
this and other articles. But the Council of Europe has gone much fur-
ther; in 1987 it established the Committee for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Members of the
Committee can simply turn up at a place of detention at any time to
check up on what is going on there. This does not always work perfect-
ly. A recent visit to Britain’s Belmarsh prison, where suspected “terror-
ists” are held, was recently delayed for a short while for a profoundly
English reason. The prison officers refused to interrupt their tea break
to let the inspecting team in. But generally it works very well.
Let us now speculate on what the consequences would be if the
USA somehow became a European country and signed on to the
Convention. This is not quite so fantastic as it sounds, since on this side
of the Atlantic there is a Convention, the American Convention on
Human Rights, to which the USA could accede if it wished. This
Convention is modelled upon and similar to the European Convention
as it existed before the institutions were remodelled by the Eleventh
Protocol. It is, however, by no means simply a copy, and the USA has
never become a party to this Convention. Now as you will know the US
government from time to time adopts a position of defiance of interna-
tional law, as it did in the consular notification case which I have men-
tioned. When it does so its posture is one of outrage at the cheekiness
or uppityness of this or that international body, just as was the British
press reaction to the decision in the Gibraltar case. But it is worth
remembering that this stance has by no means always been adopted.
Americans have in the past played an active part in the protection of
human rights, and very many do so today. So I suppose things might
someday change, and the USA might sign on to the American
Convention, though at the moment any such possibility looks remote.
If, as in my game of “Let’s pretend,” the USA was bound by the
European Convention then there is no doubt that there would be prob-
lems over various governmental activities in the USA. For example,
some prison conditions would present a difficulty, as would long term
detention of asylum seekers, the use of corporal punishment, the death
penalty, the phenomenon of death row, some trial procedures, the exe-
cution of juveniles, the use of stun guns, possible the three strikes out
system, the practice of shooting escaping felons, the use of deadly force
by the police. One can argue about the details, but the effect would be
considerable. But the present situation is that the USA lives by the
export theory of human rights, and remains, in practical terms, account-
able to no international body for violations of human rights. Americans
enjoy of course domestic protection from violation of their rights, a pro-
tection which is of course, by no means perfect, but is nevertheless
extensive and vastly better than what obtains in many countries around
the globe. But an American whose rights are violated cannot take his or
her complaint to any effective international tribunal.
Would the USA and its citizens and denizens be better or worse off
under the European Convention or some similar instrument? I think it
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is plain that many individuals would certainly be better off, just as many
Europeans have benefited from the Convention. The cost for this would
of course be some degree of restriction on the powers of American
states and the federal government, and of the agencies of government
generally, including the courts. There are, as the economists remind us,
no free lunches.
So far as the conduct of foreign relations is concerned, I incline to
think that the USA would derive significant benefits from the enhanced
reputation it would enjoy in the world, which would increase its ability
to pursue its legitimate interests through cooperation with other coun-
tries. In international relations a good reputation is a valuable asset. Let
me give you an illustration of something that has done immense harm
to the reputation of the USA - Guantánamo. Under the European sys-
tem a country establishing a Guantánamo would be accountable inter-
nationally for what went on there, and the place could be visited, with-
out warning, by the Torture Committee. So if evil things were going on
there we should know about it. And there would have to be an effective
remedy for victims of any misconduct. But if in fact nothing evil is
going on there we should all be reassured about that. I have never been
there but to be frank so much information as has emerged seems to me
to be pretty shocking and to give rise to the gravest suspicions. In no cir-
cumstances whatsoever would the use of torture or inhuman or degrad-
ing punishment be permissible there. Currently the perception enter-
tained by many people out there in the world is that Guantánamo is an
outrage - this may or may not be correct, but the US Government has
only itself to blame for this. I doubt that Guantánamo will ever quite
achieve the significance of Guernica, one reason being that Picasso is
no longer around to immortalise the institution, as he immortalised the
bombing of Guernica, and made of it an enduring memorial to the evils
of fascism. But it will be a very long time before it is forgotten. The
USA would be in a much more influential and therefore powerful posi-
tion in the world in terms of its soft power if Guantánamo had never
happened, and soft power comes much cheaper than military power, the
use of which always generates hatred. People just do not like being
bombed or mutilated or whatever. The price would, under an interna-
tional system, be some loss of sovereignty. But all co-operative arrange-
ments, whether between individuals or between states, entail some sur-
render of autonomy as the quid pro quo for the benefits received; if you
want to enjoy a game of tennis you have to abide by the rules. Just as in
the case of a voluntary sale the parties, as if by magic, both end up bet-
ter off by paying the price and giving up the ownership of the asset sold.
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